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f r o m  t h e  C o - e d I t o r s
dear hemisphere readers:
florida international university’s latin american and caribbean center (lacc) and the university of 
miami’s center for latin american studies (clas) established the miami consortium for latin american and 
caribbean studies to join forces in promoting knowledge about latin america and the caribbean.  This issue 
of hemisphere, co-edited by the centers’ directors, is an example of that partnership.  What better theme for 
this issue than the partnerships being established, negotiated and consolidated across the pacific between latin 
america and asia? 
 This issue also begins a broader debate on asian-latin american relations currently being undertaken by the 
miami consortium.  The miami consortium works hard to leverage its strategic position at the intersection 
of north and south, and now it is positioning itself at the crossroads of the vast transformation happening 
in the global south.  for example, clas’s “asia and latin america in the 21st century” series features high-
profile events designed to examine and discuss the relationship between the two regions.  its “miami’s asia 
summit” brings together leaders to focus on the evolving ties between asia and latin america, and “asia and 
latin america: setting the agenda” explores new dynamics of the relationship between the two regions, sets 
a framework for studying their interaction in the coming decade and inaugurates clas’s asia-latin america 
Working group. much work remains to be done to promote scholarship and deepen the understanding of these 
two world regions today.  
The relationship between latin america and asia is not new.  The two regions have been linked since colonial 
times.  The manila galleons known as naos de China sailed once or twice per year across the pacific between 
spanish-controlled manila and acapulco, bringing riches from both continents.  soon after latin american 
independence, chinese immigrants settled in countries throughout the region, lured by work on the railroads 
and ports.  Japanese immigrants who chose Brazil and peru as their new homes soon followed and today, the 
Japanese communities in Brazil and peru are among the largest of the Japanese diaspora.  more recently, Koreans 
have set their sights on latin american countries in search of investment opportunities. industrious Korean 
communities now flourish in several countries.  
With prosperity after the second World War came international projection.  Japan and taiwan became 
visible presences in the region and provided important sources of economic aid and technical cooperation.  The 
transformation of the arid tropical savanna of the Brazilian cerrado into the largest agricultural region in the 
southern hemisphere owes a great deal to the Japan-Brazil agricultural development cooperation program.  in 
recognition, Brazilian researchers named the new tropical variety of soybean in the region “doko,” after the late 
toshio doko, president of toshiba, chairman of the federation of economic organizations and a great friend 
of Brazil.  during the same period, taiwan has emerged as one of the largest bilateral donors to central america 
at levels similar to the us and spain. 
in 2003, south Korea became the first asian country to establish a free trade partnership with a latin 
american country,  chile.  india’s interest and presence in the region is also steadily increasing.  over the course 
of the past decade, the number of latin american and caribbean embassies based in new delhi has increased by 
a third and the number of indian embassies in the lac region has doubled. 
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during the last decade, the big asian actor in latin america has been – and, some would argue, will 
continue to be – the people’s republic of china.  The current latin american economic miracle has been, to 
a large extent, the result of the region’s growing ties to china.  latin american exports to china are booming 
and chinese investment in the region is as robust as can be.  however, the complementary nature of their 
economies is not enough to hide tensions generated by an unfavorable balance of trade and payments in china’s 
favor.  With few exceptions, latin americans are reacting with caution to chinese interest in going beyond 
trade and investment to build alliances with institutional players, including the military. 
in the coming decades, latin america’s international economic insertion will be determined by its 
relationship with other emerging economies.  according to the economic commission for latin america and 
the caribbean (eclac), south-south trade is the leading engine of growth in global trade.  in 1985, south-
south flows represented 6% of global trade; in 2010 they reached 25%, while north-north trade declined 
from 63% to 38%.  if these trends continue, south-south trade will surpass north-north trade by the year 
2018.  in addition to traditional migration patterns and the recent boom in investment and trade that continue 
to dominate the relationship, the exchange of ideas and the establishment common positions on the world 
stage are shaping the complex interaction between these regions. as this special issue attests, our consortium is 
paying close attention.   
We would like to thank all who contributed to this issue.  to the authors, our deepest gratitude for having 
borne our impatience so graciously, and to our consortium colleagues, liesl picard, Jordan adams and israel 
alonso, thank you for helping us in so many ways.  alisa newman, hemisphere’s longtime copy editor, has, as 
usual, done a superb job.  Thank you.
Cristina eguizábal     ariel armony
director      director
Latin American and Caribbean Center   Center for Latin American Studies
florida international university   university of miami
Hemisphere Volume 21 5
6 Hemisphere Volume 21
Latin america and asia:  
Globalization trumps  
power politics
By Julia C. Strauss 
i
n the past decade, asia 
and latin america have 
embarked on an adventure 
of discovery of the other, 
encouraging a flurry of 
interest in policymaking, business 
and ngo circles.  in the past 15 
years, china in particular has gone 
from having no presence to speak 
of in latin america to being the 
first or second leading trade partner 
of such important economies as 
Brazil, peru and chile.  at present, 
in the words of one inter-american 
development Bank (iadB) 
analyst, all eyes are on india as the 
“next big thing” for latin america.  
The overwhelming dominance of 
business and trade in the equation 
raises the question, what is the 
political nature of the relationship 
I n t r o d u C I n G  t h e  I s s u e s
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between asia and latin america? 
in practice, the economic and 
political spheres so inform each 
other that it is difficult to conceive 
of one without the other.  in asia 
especially, politics and business 
are intertwined, as revealed by the 
strong links between government 
and large businesses in china, 
Japan, and Korea.  in china 
especially, it is difficult to ascertain 
where the state ends and private 
businesses begin.  While the factors 
behind the emergence of asian-
latin american connections at 
this point in time may seem to be 
predominantly economic, therefore, 
political factors have also played 
a role.  The end of the cold War 
in the early 1990s and the sudden 
dominance of neo-liberal norms of 
globalization and trade interacted 
with domestic developments in 
latin america (democratization) 
and asia (the global economic 
rise of china and the emergence 
of india and Brazil) to create 
an economic and ideational 
environment in which asia and 
latin america complement and 
“need” each other in a global 
economic division of labor.  
The economies of asia and 
latin america are – with a few 
important exceptions, such as 
mexico and, in part, Brazil – largely 
complementary.  The industrialized 
economies of asia, particularly those 
of resource-poor countries such as 
Japan and south Korea, require the 
minerals, foodstuffs and oil that the 
primary commodity exporters of 
latin america are able to supply.  at 
least until now, china’s oft-repeated 
slogan of “win-win” in a globalized 
world actually seems to hold 
true under most conditions with 
respect to latin america, despite 
legitimate concerns about who wins 
(businesses and aggregate wealth vs. 
organized labor, the environment 
and local industries).  
The global economic crisis of 
the last four years has, if anything, 
only intensified interest in asian-
latin american trade.  in a world 
in which us and european political 
institutions have been revealed as 
profoundly ill-equipped to deal 
with current economic challenges, 
it is entirely understandable that 
states and societies in both asia and 
latin america would find much of 
value in the other in political, social 
and economic terms, and much 
of common interest.  for all their 
differences, most of the states in 
asia and latin america, with the 
exception of Japan, have directly 
experienced the humiliations 
of colonialism and protracted 
economic underdevelopment.  most 
identify with the developing world 
and have reasons to be skeptical of 
us hegemony. 
politics, particularly international 
politics, has long been conceptualized 
in terms of the direct pursuit of 
strategic interests.  for a long time 
this kind of thinking accounted 
for the shallowness of political 
relations between most of asia and 
latin america.  separated by a vast 
ocean and with economies largely 
oriented toward the united states, 
asia had little incentive to involve 
itself in latin america, other than 
china’s pursuit of formal diplomatic 
recognition and its attempts to 
isolate taiwan.  traces of these 
concerns remain, particularly for 
china, as most of the small states 
that still recognize taiwan are in 
central america and the caribbean. 
a political view of asia and 
latin america in the twenty-first 
century must incorporate the 
crosscutting currents of accelerating 
post-cold War globalization.  The 
two regions are experiencing a 
rapid proliferation of ties of all 
sorts:  economic ties through 
trade and investment, personal 
ties through the soft power 
instruments of educational and 
cultural exchange, and individual 
and family ties through sojourning 
and migration.  in this rapidly 
expanding complex, politics are 
never far from the surface, whether 
the formal world of high politics; 
less easily discerned but perhaps 
more important informal, local and 
personal politics; and issues that 
link the two, such as the chinese 
government’s displeasure over the 
dalai lama’s recent visit to mexico. 
asia and latin america are active 
participants in the extraordinary 
global movement toward multilateral 
forums and international 
organizations since the early 1990s.  
These include organizations to 
promote or implement free trade 
agreements, such as mercosur, the 
andean community and asia pacific 
economic cooperation (apec), and 
others intended to ensure regional 
security and stability, including the 
organization of american states, 
association of southeast asian 
nations (asean) and the shanghai 
Introducing the Issues
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security organization.  a great deal 
of slippage has occurred between the 
economic and the political, however, 
and many multilateral organizations 
founded for one purpose have 
expanded beyond their original 
writ and clientele.  mercosur, for 
example, began to assume political 
functions by the mid 1990s and is 
now deeply committed to promoting 
political as well as economic 
integration for all of south america.  
asean was originally founded as a 
security organization to contain the 
spread of communism from Vietnam 
and china, but it now includes 
cambodia and (communist) 
Vietnam as members and frequently 
engages in dialogue with china and 
Japan.  political interest has also 
grown in extra-regional multilateral 
forums and organizations, as in 
the case of south Korea’s (2005) 
and china’s (2009) decisions to 
join Japan’s long-standing presence 
(1976) in the iadB. 
in considering the proliferation 
of formal and informal contacts 
between asia and latin america, 
two broad analytical points can aid 
in sorting out confusion.  first, 
Japan’s early experiences have 
provided a template for other asian 
countries in establishing their own 
versions of the developmental state 
at home and in their pursuit of 
foreign influence abroad.  second, 
a range of soft power tools and 
informal relations, especially 
through migration and diaspora 
communities, play an important 
role and converge with formal 
bilateral relations and multilateral 
institutions in interesting ways.  
Brazil, for example, now hosts the 
largest community of citizens of 
Japanese descent anywhere outside 
of their homeland.  Japan was also 
well positioned to capitalize on its 
pre-World War ii ties with latin 
america and develop the type of aid 
and investment policies that are now 
thought of as particularly chinese 
(investment in big infrastructure 
projects; little attention to 
environmental or governance 
concerns).  Korean businesses and 
migration began to flow toward 
latin america in the 1990s, and the 
south Korean government is deeply 
involved in establishing academic 
and public policy programs 
in argentina and other latin 
american countries.  china is not 
far behind, coordinating frequent 
bilateral visits, the establishment 
of soft power institutions such as 
confucius institutes, and a recently 
released policy paper outlining 
china’s efforts to accelerate mutual 
knowledge and cooperation in latin 
america in every imaginable sphere.
china’s profile, important as it 
is, should not be viewed outside 
a wider asian context.  The 
importance of east asia for latin 
america was formally recognized in 
1995 with the iadB’s establishment 
of an asia office in tokyo to facilitate 
linkages between governments and 
business communities in Japan, 
Korea and china.  The office 
also organizes informational 
and academic seminars on latin 
america for the benefit of those 
constituencies.  one can only 
imagine what kind of concerted 
effort the indian government will 
make to formalize and accelerate 
its formal relations with latin 
america to complement its 
increasing private investment, and 
how a potential indian approach 
might differ from the more statist 
northeast asian response. 
asia and latin america are 
pursuing political and economic 
linkages with the aim of, at least 
partially, offsetting the historic 
economic and political dominance 
of the united states and Western 
europe.  Yet even as they strive 
to deepen formal and informal, 
bilateral and multilateral relations, 
us influence provides both 
opportunities and constraints.  
chinese political and policy 
journals frequently refer to latin 
america as being in the united 
states’ “backyard,” despite the 
problematic connotations of the 
term for latin americans.  in these 
and other ways, early twenty-first 
century patterns of globalization 
provide the currents of economic, 
social and political interaction 
between asia and latin america.  
trade is a big part of this complex 
of relationships, but so too are the 
multitude of ways in which people, 
networks and concepts travel, 
become indigenized, and provide 
the raw materials for mutual 
understanding and cooperation. ■
Julia C. Strauss is Senior Lecturer in 
Chinese Politics in the Department of 
Politics and International Studies and 
a member of the Centre of Chinese 
Studies at the University of London.
Introducing the Issues
a
ny discussion about 
latin america’s 
economic situation 
today inevitably                      
involves the topic 
of china. trade between china 
and latin america has grown 
exponentially in recent years, 
skyrocketing from $10 billion in 
2000 to $179 billion in 2010.  
china’s sizzling economic growth 
and its emergence as a global 
economic power have come with a 
rising diplomatic, cultural and even 
military presence in the americas.
in spite of the impressive figures, 
there is considerable debate 
about the impact of china’s 
economic rise on latin american 
development.  as Kevin gallagher 
and roberto porzecanski put it, 
the “dragon in the room” is the 
challenge china poses to latin 
america’s competitiveness in world 
and regional markets.  trade with 
china is also charming some 
countries in the region toward a 
path of specialization that may 
hurt their long-term prospects for 
economic development.
china had virtually no presence 
in latin america only two decades 
ago, and its expansion has been 
felt as a sudden “desembarco” 
(landing).  latin americans are 
still trying to make sense of this 
landing.  public perception of 
china is not as positive in the 
region as it is in africa, but in 
recent polls a higher percentage of 
latin american respondents rated 
china’s influence on their countries 
as a good thing than those who 
could say the same about the us.  
These figures suggest a willingness 
to accept china as a newcomer in 
the hemisphere and to welcome 
deeper relations with the east 
asian country.
upon closer inspection, of 
course, significant variation can 
be found across countries and 
sectors within each country.  The 
very concept of latin america has 
become gradually more diluted 
as countries in the region pursue 
different strategies of regional 
integration.  more important, as 
gallagher and porzecanski explain, 
latin america’s trade with china is 
concentrated in only six countries 
and ten commodities.  china’s 
impact is uneven and poses very 
different challenges across the 
region.
for the most part, latin american 
visions of china are based on an 
“imported orientalism” dominated 
by misrepresentations of chinese 
society and culture.  a combination 
of timeworn images of china as 
“mysterious” and the projection of 
Western beliefs and interests onto 
china have colored latin american 
conceptions of the east asian 
country.  The lacunae of knowledge 
about china in latin america and 
the largely blank slate upon which 
the relationship is being built offer 
an opportunity to create a new 
vision to correct imported views and 
existing biases.
Throughout latin america, 
rather than being considered a 
distant actor, china is increasingly 
What Is China to Latin america?
By Ariel Armony
s p e C I a L  f o C u s :  C h I n a  a n d  L a t I n  a m e r I C a
Brazilians rehearse the Dragon dance for the upcoming Chinese New Year celebration at Liberdade 
Square in São Paulo, Brazil on January 19, 2010. YASUYoSHI CHIBA/AFP/Getty Images.
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special focus
viewed as a tangible, concrete, 
albeit looming and problematic, 
presence.  although political 
preferences and ideology may 
influence media coverage in 
any given area, some common 
concerns have emerged about 
china’s expansionism; namely, 
skepticism regarding the actual 
benefits that china brings to the 
region, and the long-term effects 
of this engagement.  as expected, 
coverage of china emphasizes 
the east asian nation’s economic 
power, but questions have also 
arisen about china’s commitment 
to fulfill its responsibilities as a 
rising global power.  many latin 
americans wonder about the 
sustainability and global impact 
of chinese involvement.  china’s 
landing in latin america has 
triggered new debates focused 
on strategic options, damage 
control and development models, 
among other issues.  most of the 
discussions occur in the realm of 
economics and politics, yet the 
debate over ideas, identity, rhetoric 
and worldviews is probably the one 
with the most serious implications 
for the future of the interaction 
between the two regions. 
What is china to latin america? 
among other things, china 
represents a market, a partner 
and a competitor.  china’s need 
for primary commodities to feed 
its manufacturing growth and 
unprecedented urbanization entails 
a vast demand for everything 
from soybeans to copper as well as 
higher prices for such commodities 
in the international market.  latin 
american exports to china have 
skyrocketed in response to this 
demand in the last decade.  high 
commodity prices and ample 
revenues are helping to sustain 
economic growth and strengthen 
fiscal accounts in several countries.
as mentioned above, however, 
chinese demand mainly benefits 
commodity producers in south 
american countries such as Brazil, 
chile, argentina and peru.  The 
smaller countries of central 
america and the caribbean cannot 
benefit from trade with china 
unless they find a niche market 
(such as costa rican coffee).  The 
reliance on primary commodities 
also entails the risk of resource 
dependency for exporting 
nations. This pattern of trade has 
clear limitations for long-term 
development.  among other 
limitations, it is not a big job 
creator and it does not contribute 
by itself (that is, without state 
intervention) to alleviate poverty 
and inequality.  in brief, china is a 
market for latin america, and one 
with great potential, but a shift 
from “fairy tale” to realism will 
have to occur if the region wants 
sustained benefits in the long run.
is china a partner for latin 
america?  china has the potential 
to collaborate with latin american 
countries in a number of ways: 
in the realms of technology, 
infrastructure, poverty reduction 
and educational programs; as 
a source of foreign investment 
and aid; and as an ally on the 
diplomatic front.  as Juan 
gabriel tokatlian has argued, 
for example, china’s model of 
international diplomacy entails 
some attractive notions for latin 
america:  multilateral politics, 
noninterference in domestic 
affairs, sovereign integrity, 
horizontal collaboration between 
“equals” and pragmatism.  a 
concrete potential for partnership 
exists in this realm. 
china conceives of its national 
security as a three-pronged 
approach:  “national sovereignty” 
(territorial integrity and national 
reunification), “comprehensive 
security” (preservation of its 
political and economic system and 
cultural heritage), and “security 
in the global system” (terms of 
insertion in the international 
system).  to guarantee terms of 
insertion that could satisfy the 
chinese leadership’s demand for 
“equality, fairness, and justice,” 
Beijing needs partners.  latin 
american countries can play a 
role in the pursuit of a common 
agenda oriented to counter us 
hegemony; just as china often 
perceives that the us strategy of 
“engagement” is actually intended 
to contain its rising power, latin 
america has a strong preference 
for multipolarity. 
as a major player in multilateral 
organizations, china understands 
the necessity of courting votes.  
Beijing pays significant attention 
to promoting partnerships with 
a wide variety of countries, 
regardless of their size or economic 
power.  confucius’s phrase 
“one more friend, one more 
way” captures well this strategic 
approach.  still, it is important to 
note that Beijing conceives of its 
relationship with latin america as 
under the lens of us hegemonic 
power in the hemisphere.  
accordingly, any convergence with 
latin america in international 
politics, and particularly in 
hemispheric politics, is subordinate 
to its implications for sino-us 
relations.  in addition, china’s 
external model of diplomacy may 
be seductive to latin american 
countries, but the region’s 
commitment to democracy – even 
with serious deficiencies – has 
defined a path that diverges from 
china’s domestic political model.  
Brazil in particular will most 
likely have to face this divergence 
in the near future as it adopts a 
leadership role in the global south.
There is a dark side to sino-
latin american partnership.  it 
involves the risk that china’s zou 
chuqu or “going out” strategy 
(official encouragement of chinese 
enterprises searching for greater 
investment opportunities around 
the world, whether large, state-
owned enterprises or individual 
and family entrepreneurs seeking 
business deals overseas) may 
bring with it traditional informal 
business practices and closed-
door deal making.  chinese 
corruption is likely to find a 
welcoming environment in latin 
america and could contribute to 
undermine the rule of law in the 
region.  similarly, china’s foreign 
aid programs – which are touted as 
different from Western assistance 
because they have no strings 
attached – lack transparency 
and accountability.  criticism of 
china’s foreign aid has been so 
extensive that in early 2011 Beijing 
released an official report intended 
to explain its foreign assistance 
practices, but which in fact 
provided only limited information 
on the specifics of chinese aid 
programs and distribution of funds 
around the world.
There can be no doubt that 
china is a competitor for latin 
america.  The expansion of 
china’s manufacturing capabilities 
is damaging latin american 
exports in global, regional and 
domestic markets.  chinese 
exports are not only competing 
with domestic production in latin 
american countries, they are also 
undermining the competitiveness 
of latin american exports in 
third markets, namely, the united 
states, the european union and 
the markets of trading partners 
in latin america.  gallagher 
and porzecanski calculate that, 
as of 2006, “94 percent of all 
latin american and caribbean 
manufacturing exports were 
‘under threat’ from their chinese 
counterparts, representing 40 
percent of all [the region’s] 
exports.”  sectors such as electrical 
equipment, metal products and 
industrial machinery are facing the 
greatest impact.
china’s emergence as a 
competitor is a wake-up call 
for latin america.  Blaming 
china for not playing by the 
rules is not enough.  chinese 
competition stresses the need 
for latin american countries to 
increase spending on research 
and marketing, improve product 
quality, invest in infrastructure 
and reduce logistical costs.  sound 
policies that seek diversification 
and upgrade the quality of the 
domestic labor force are urgently 
needed.
even as observers attempt to 
make sense of china’s landing in 
latin america, india is attempting 
to follow its model.  as Jorge 
heine explains in this issue, india’s 
trade with latin america is still 
modest compared to china’s, but 
it has had a growing economic 
presence since 2000.  analysts 
expect that, as india catches up 
with china in terms of exports 
and foreign direct investment, 
its trade with latin america will 
expand dramatically within the 
next decade.
We are witnessing times of 
extraordinary transformation.  
These changes pose unprecedented 
challenges and unique 
opportunities for latin america.  
deeper integration between 
latin america and china (and, 
eventually, india) will require a 
combination of coherent policies, 
realism and innovation if these 
new relationships can be expected 
to yield positive outcomes and 
synergies for latin america in the 
long run. ■
Ariel Armony is Weeks Professor in 
Latin American Studies, Professor of 
International Studies and Director of 
the Center for Latin American Studies 
(CLAS) at the University of Miami.
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c
hina publicly 
acknowledged the 
strategic importance 
of latin america for 
its economic policy 
for the first time in a policy paper 
published in november 2008, but 
for the last decade or so, it has been 
developing much closer relations 
with the region.  according to 
chinese statistics, bilateral trade 
increased from $15 billion in 2001 
to more than $200 billion in 2011.  
total chinese investment in the 
region grew from $4.6 billion in 
2003 to $43.9 billion in 2010 – 
although 92%, or $40.5 billion, was 
concentrated in the British Virgin 
islands and the cayman islands. 
political, non-governmental, cultural 
and even military cooperation and 
exchange have also moved forward 
steadily.  The current relationship 
between china and latin america 
is most likely the best it has ever 
been since columbus “discovered” 
the new World in 1492 – even if, 
as some scholars argue, the chinese 
navigator Zheng he beat him to it 
in 1421.
Both china and latin america 
have expressed their interest and 
determination to promote bilateral 
relations.  to achieve this objective, 
however, both sides will need to 
address a number of issues.  The 
first and most important priority 
is to reduce trade frictions.  
cheaply priced chinese products 
have posed great challenges to 
uncompetitive enterprises in latin 
america, resulting in efforts to 
restrict chinese exports, mainly 
through anti-dumping.  since 
1989, when Brazil became the first 
latin american country to levy 
anti-dumping tariffs against china 
to protect its domestic market, 
many of the major trade partners 
in latin america have resorted to 
this practice.  anti-dumping tariffs 
can be extremely high.  in the early 
1990s, for instance, mexico charged 
a tariff of 1105% for chinese shoes, 
a rate tantamount to a total ban on 
imports.  most of latin america’s 
anti-dumping cases against china, 
in fact, are incompatible with World 
trade organization (Wto) rules.
according to the terms of china’s 
admission into the Wto in 2001, 
the country will automatically be 
granted so-called market economy 
status (mes) in 2016.  By then, 
many chinese officials believe, 
chinese exports might face less 
anti-dumping from trade partners, 
including those in latin america.  
at the very least, china’s trade 
partners will not be permitted 
to choose a third country at will 
for price comparison in judging 
whether china dumps or not.  
Without mes, china does not 
stand up well to comparison given 
its low labor costs.
at the same time that latin 
america has courted greater chinese 
investment in the region, china has 
been implementing a “going global” 
strategy, encouraging chinese 
enterprises to invest abroad.  to take 
advantage of this win-win scenario, 
latin america needs to improve 
its investment climate.  chinese 
investors, in turn, must familiarize 
themselves with the laws of the host 
countries, prepare for labor strikes 
and adapt to local business practices. 
undoubtedly, they should also 
assume more social responsibility.
The second issue in improving the 
bilateral relationship is to overcome 
fear of china on the latin american 
side.  public opinion in latin 
america often fails to recognize that, 
on the whole, china contributes 
positively to development in the 
region.  for instance, china’s 
demand for latin american raw 
materials has pushed up the prices 
of these resources on the world 
market.  no less important, cheap 
chinese exports have helped 
curtail inflation.  in april 2011, 
a Financial Times reporter found 
that almost every chinese product 
sold at a small shop in a são paulo 
favela, from lipstick and handbags 
to plastic figures of Buzz lightyear, 
was five times cheaper than the 
same item made in Brazil.  “it has 
to be,” the shop owner said of the 
ubiquity of chinese merchandise, 
“otherwise lots of people here 
couldn’t afford it.” 
The third issue concerns the 
matter of mutual understanding 
to consolidate trust and defuse 
misconceptions.  official visits help; 
china’s president and vice president 
traveled to latin america within 
two months of each other in late 
2004 and early 2005, and again in 
late 2008 and early 2009.  generally 
speaking, however, geographical 
distance and differences in language, 
cultural traditions, political systems, 
etc., have resulted in a lack of 
mutual understanding between the 
two sides.
finally, the “us factor” is an 
obstacle in china’s relations with 
latin america.  members of the us 
congress, the media and even some 
Chinese Investment in Latin 
america: a Win-Win situation
By Jiang Shixue
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academics have expressed concern 
at the growing chinese presence 
in latin america.  in april 2006, 
thomas shannon, then the 
united states assistant secretary 
of state for Western hemisphere 
affairs, traveled to Beijing and 
discussed china’s policy towards 
latin america with the chinese 
foreign ministry. 
The us has no cause for concern.  
china understands that latin 
america is in the united states’ 
“backyard” and has neither the 
interest nor ability to challenge its 
traditional sphere of influence there.  
moreover, china’s relations with 
latin america are part of a broader 
trend of south-south economic 
cooperation that benefits the united 
states as well. 
spain has offered to help china 
develop its bilateral relations with 
latin america, taking advantage of 
its linguistic and cultural ties and 
well-established market networks in 
the region, and so far, the results of 
this triangulation are encouraging.  
on october 1, 2010, for instance, 
sinopec, one of china’s largest 
energy companies, announced 
that it would invest $7.1 billion in 
repsol Ypf Brasil, giving it a 40% 
stake in the Brazilian enterprise.  
if similar triangulation could be 
established between china, the 
united states and latin america, 
wouldn’t the result be a triple win 
for all three parties? ■
Jiang Shixue is a professor at the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
and vice president of the Chinese 
Association of Latin American Studies.
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The new Banks in town:  
Chinese finance in Latin america
By Amos Irwin, Kevin Gallagher and 
Katherine Koleski
i
n the last few years, china 
has gone from being a non-
player in latin american 
finance to ranking as one of 
the region’s leading creditors.  
although individual loans have 
been reported in the press, no 
systematic studies have documented 
the rise of chinese lending in latin 
america and the caribbean (lac).  
The lack of public information 
about these loans has caused their 
terms and conditions to become a 
source of speculation and concern.
The flood of china-lac loans 
has been criticized by Western 
observers.  The Financial Times, 
for example, warns of “escalating 
competition over loan deals” in 
latin america between chinese 
banks and the World Bank.  These 
sources argue that chinese banks 
offer ultra-low interest rates to 
outcompete Western banks.  
chinese banks, they warn, are 
replacing Western banks that attach 
policy conditions to protect social 
and environmental welfare.  They 
suggest that china is exploiting 
lac oil exporters with oil-backed 
loans, or “loans-for-oil.”
most of these claims are either 
unfounded or come with many 
caveats.  since none of these sources 
have access to hard data on chinese 
lending to lac, their claims are 
largely based on speculation.  to 
attempt a more empirically-based 
understanding of these issues, we 
built a comprehensive database 
of chinese lending in lac and 
compared it to lending by other 
major players.  
We confirm that chinese lending 
to the region is large and growing 
at an impressive rate.  our work 
attempts to offer a balanced view 
of the implications of such lending. 
While others have thrown their 
hands in the air in praise or in 
fear, we see the potential for both 
positive and negative consequences. 
china’s lending to lac brings new 
benefits to the region, but it also 
brings new risks.
most of china’s international 
lending comes from the china 
development Bank (cdB) and 
china export-import (ex-im) 
Bank.  during its 1994 reforms of 
the financial sector, the chinese 
government created cdB and 
china ex-im as “policy banks.”  
Their loans serve the government’s 
policy objectives of supporting 
infrastructure, industry and 
exports.  Both banks have backed 
Jiang Zemin’s “going global” 
policy, which encourages the 
internationalization of chinese 
investment and trade by lending 
to overseas chinese companies 
and business partners.  in the 
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last few years, these banks have 
become leading creditors for latin 
american governments.
since chinese banks do not 
issue transparent annual reports or 
statistics, there is no easy way to 
measure their loans abroad.  given 
the lack of data, we examined 
government, bank and press reports 
in both china and borrowing 
countries to compile a list of loans 
and their characteristics.  We 
estimate that since 2005, chinese 
“policy banks” have committed 
approximately $75 billion in 
loans to lac.  in 2010, chinese 
banks committed more than the 
World Bank, inter-american 
development Bank (iadB) and us 
ex-im Bank combined (see figure 
1).  our estimate should not be 
taken as a precise sum but rather a 
well-documented ballpark estimate. 
on the one hand, we may have 
underestimated chinese finance in 
latin america because we do not 
include loans under $50 million.  
on the other hand, we may have 
overestimated the total because the 
parties involved could partially or 
entirely cancel some loans.  loan 
agreements, such as argentina’s $10 
Figure 1: Comparison of Chinese, World Bank, IADB, and US Ex-Im Lending to LAC.
billion agreement in 2010, simply 
set an amount to be carved up 
into projects later and may be only 
partially fulfilled.
no Cutthroat Interest rate 
Competition 
many Western observers have 
worried that chinese banks are 
“competing” against Western 
banks with low interest rates.  
The Washington Post argues 
that china is using “low-ball 
financing” to make its export 
credits more attractive.  “china 
has handed out billions of dollars 
at less than 1 percent interest,” 
the editors note.  “This has 
become a headache for Western 
competitors, especially members 
of the 32-nation organization 
for economic cooperation and 
development (oecd), which long 
ago agreed not to use financing as a 
competitive tool.” 
in fact, our study shows that 
both cdB and china ex-im 
charge higher rates on most of their 
loans to lac than their Western 
counterparts require. china ex-im 
offers some smaller loans at lower 
rates but, like the World Bank, it 
does so to provide development 
aid rather than to undercut its 
competitors. The majority of 
china ex-im’s lac funding carries 
market rates.
When we compare development 
banks, cdB’s interest rates actually 
exceed World Bank (iBrd) rates.  
for example, in 2010, cdB offered 
argentina a $10 billion loan at 600 
basis points above liBor (interest 
rate for loans between banks).  
The same year, the iBrd granted 
argentina a $30 million loan at 85 
basis points above liBor. in all 
the cases we found, cdB interest 
rates exceeded iBrd rates on 
similar loans. 
When we compare the chinese 
and american export credit 
agencies, china ex-im offers 
slightly lower rates than us ex-im 
on small projects and higher rates 
on larger projects.  to compare 
china and us ex-im interest rates, 
we subtract the oecd’s “country 
risk” premiums to compensate 
for the fact that some countries 
are riskier than others.  While the 
us bank charges 1.5-2.5% above 
the oecd risk premium, china 
ex-im’s low rates fall only slightly 
above the premium itself.  other 
than the high rate for ecuador’s 
coca-codo-sinclair dam, china’s 
rates fall 1-2% below us rates. 
rather than as cutthroat 
competition, the low china ex-
im rates should be viewed as 
development aid.  instead of offering 
below-market credit through its 
development bank, china channels 
it through its ex-im Bank. This 
explains both the higher cdB and 
lower ex-im rates.  since the iBrd 
is offering below-market interest 
rates, it is no surprise that cdB’s 
interest rates are higher.  it is also 
unsurprising that china ex-im 
Bank’s concessional interest rates 
fall 1-2% below us ex-im’s 
commercial rates.
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The majority of china ex-im’s 
lending, however, is unsubsidized 
commercial lending at much higher 
interest rates.  commercial loans 
constitute more than 80% of china 
ex-im’s lending to lac, including 
a $2.4 billion loan for the Baha 
mar resort in the Bahamas and 
a $1.7 billion loan for ecuador’s 
coca-codo-sinclair dam.  china 
ex-im Bank charged 6.9% interest 
on the latter, about 2% higher than 
us ex-im rates even adjusting for 
ecuador’s high-risk premium. The 
evidence therefore suggests that 
neither cdB nor china ex-im 
subsidizes interest rates to undercut 
Western lenders.
Chinese Banks Give Large Loans 
to high-risk Countries
one would expect chinese 
banks to loan to creditworthy 
countries that can afford their 
commercial interest rates.  instead, 
chinese banks dedicated 61% 
of their lending to the lowest-
rated borrowers in latin america, 
Venezuela and ecuador.  This is an 
enormous share considering that 
these countries make up only 8% 
of the lac region’s population and 
7% of its gdp.  over the same 
period (since 2005), these two 
nations received 13% of iadB 
loans and virtually nothing from 
the World Bank or us ex-im Bank. 
meanwhile, chinese banks gave 
almost nothing to West-friendly 
mexico, colombia and peru despite 
their sizeable economies and 
resource endowments.  only Brazil 
and argentina received significant 
loans from both Western and 
chinese banks.
chinese loans to high-risk 
countries are helping compensate 
for the absence of sovereign debt 
markets.  ecuador essentially cut 
itself off from mainstream lending 
by defaulting on its sovereign 
debt in 2008-09.  The Venezuelan 
government has scared off investors 
by violating private property 
rights.  as a result, the sovereign 
debt markets charge ecuador and 
Venezuela unaffordable spreads 
of 935 and 1220 basis points, 
respectively, four to six times higher 
than colombian and peruvian 
spreads.  chinese lending is 
substituting for private capital that 
these high-risk countries cannot 
afford.  in ecuador’s case, chinese 
lending has given the government a 
second chance to rebuild both the 
economy and investor confidence. 
Chinese Banks Lower Costs by 
attaching strings:  Loans-for-oil 
and purchase requirements
how can chinese banks offer 
such high-risk loans at affordable 
interest rates?  We have seen that for 
the most part they do not use state 
subsidies to lower interest rates.  
The question then becomes why 
the cost of their loans is so low.  for 
example, cdB offered Venezuela 
$20 billion at a floating rate of 
50-285 basis points over liBor.  
in private sovereign debt markets, 
Venezuela would have to pay a 
spread of 935 basis points.  china 
ex-im’s commercial loans are also 
low-cost; it charged ecuador 6.9% 
on its $1.7 billion export credit, 
well below that country’s 838 basis 
point spread on sovereign debt. 
chinese banks lower the cost 
of loans to high-risk countries by 
attaching strings such as purchase 
requirements.  cdB’s $1.7 billion 
export credit to ecuador is not 
actually a loan; it is a line of credit 
for the ecuadorian government 
with chinese state-run sinohydro 
corporation. since the money goes 
straight to supporting chinese state-
owned companies, an ecuadorian 
default would be far less costly to 
the chinese government.  We found 
conditions in almost every chinese 
loan requiring the borrowers to use 
the funds for chinese construction, 
oil, telecommunications, satellite or 
train equipment.
in addition to purchase 
requirements, cdB has recently 
begun lowering financing costs 
with “loans-for-oil.”  such loans 
usually work as follows:  cdB 
grants a billion-dollar loan to an 
oil-exporting country like ecuador.  
petroecuador pledges to ship 
hundreds of thousands of barrels of 
oil to china every day for the life 
of the loan.  chinese oil companies 
deposit their oil payments into 
petroecuador’s cdB account.  cdB 
withdraws the interest due on the 
loan directly from this account.  as 
long as the country keeps exporting 
oil to china, cdB will siphon 
out a portion of the revenues to 
collect interest on the loan.  as 
cdB founder chen Yuan notes, 
“backing loans with oil shipments 
effectively keeps risks to a minimum 
level.”  The oil-backed arrangement 
helps explain the low interest rate 
on the $20 billion loan-for-oil to 
Venezuela.
many latin american and us 
observers argue that the loans 
exploit borrowers, largely because 
they misunderstand the deals.  
many assume that the borrowers 
are simply giving a set amount of 
oil to china to pay back the loan; 
however, china’s loans-for-oil 
with latin america use market 
prices.  china cannot “lock in” 
low prices or “hedge” against 
world oil price fluctuations 
because the contracts require it to 
pay the daily market price. 
The financing terms seem to be 
better for the south americans than 
most people believe.  although 
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ecuador’s prices are based on 
us market prices, petroecuador 
subtracts a per-barrel “differential” 
because its oil is of lower quality 
than us oil.  at the same time, 
it charges a small per-barrel 
“premium” for committing to 
sell so much oil in advance.  far 
from being unfair to ecuador, the 
differentials and premiums are 
consistent with ecuador’s other 
recent oil deals.
 
Chinese Loans: 
a different 
development model 
chinese banks 
tend to loan 
money to lac for 
infrastructure and 
heavy industry, 
while World Bank 
and iadB loans 
span a wider range 
of governmental, 
social and 
environmental 
purposes.  the 
chinese banks 
channel 87% of 
their loans into the 
energy, mining, infrastructure, 
transportation and housing 
(emith) sectors.  only 29% of 
iadB loans and 34% of World 
Bank loans go to those sectors; 
instead, these institutions direct 
more than a third of their loans 
toward the health, social and 
environment sectors in lac, 
which are essentially devoid of 
chinese investment.
china’s lending policy obeys a 
different development philosophy.  
in contrast to the millennium 
development goals’ focus on 
social welfare, chinese banks focus 
on economic growth.  They fund 
projects that will create jobs and 
open up new economies for chinese 
trade and investment.  The chinese 
government models its emith 
development aid on the World Bank 
loans of the 1950s and 1960s and 
Japan’s loans to china in the 1970s.
Chinese Banks roll out new 
environmental Guidelines
critics have charged that 
china turns a blind eye to the 
environmental impact of the projects 
it funds.  in fact, chinese banks 
have adopted new environmental 
guidelines containing  substantive 
requirements and standards, even if 
they are not as demanding as those 
followed by Western banks.  The 
chinese guidelines require projects 
to pass an environmental impact 
assessment (eia) prior to funding.  
unlike their Western counterparts, 
however, chinese eias require the 
project to comply with current 
environmental standards in the host 
country rather than international 
industry standards.  chinese 
banks require public consultations 
with communities affected by 
the projects but they do not 
include a grievance mechanism or 
independent monitoring and review, 
which are key requirements of 
Western banks.  like their Western 
counterparts, chinese banks 
require an ex-post eia.   The main 
difference, therefore, is the emphasis 
on compliance with domestic as 
opposed to international standards 
and the absence of a forum to 
redress grievances or obtain third-
party approval.
it is unclear to what extent 
chinese banks will actually 
follow these new 
guidelines in lac.  
china only recently 
began lending to the 
region, so we cannot 
measure their track 
record.  compliance 
with environmental 
guidelines, however, has 
remained a stumbling 
block within china, and 
theoretical guidelines 
will only translate into 
real reforms with the 
active support of the 
banks themselves.
it is our hope that our 
study and other similar 
research can help spark 
a more empirically based discussion 
among policymakers and scholars 
about china’s role in latin america.  
after more than a decade of 
significant chinese engagement with 
the region, it is far too simplistic to 
think of china as “good” or “bad” 
for lac development.  china offers 
new benefits even as it presents  
new risks. ■
 
Kevin Gallagher is an associate 
professor of international relations 
at Boston University and a senior 
researcher at the Global Development 
and Environment Institute (GDAE) 
at Tufts University.  Amos Irwin and 
Katherine Koleski are researchers 
at GDAE.
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i
n the last decade, china 
and latin america have 
increased trade dramatically, 
and chinese foreign direct 
investment (fdi) in the 
region has experienced significant 
growth in parallel.  research into 
these trends has been insufficient, 
especially considering that china 
is now the region’s second leading 
trading partner.  adding to the 
confusion, chinese and latin 
american sources often report 
different statistics.  according to 
recent estimates, however, chinese 
fdi in the region accounted for 
more than $30 billion in 2010-
2011.
several negative trends are 
associated with this increase.  
regional trade specialization with 
china, in the form of low value-
added raw material exports and 
imports of higher value-added 
manufacturing, has resulted in 
technological and balance of 
trade limitations, as well as new 
development challenges.  studies 
of value-added chains in raw 
materials also show an effective 
process of downgrading in some 
cases.  as a result of new chinese 
regulations and pressures, latin 
american exports have declined 
in technology, value-added and 
sophistication.
china’s economic development 
has called into question the 
export-oriented strategy mexico 
has followed since the late 
1980s.  china, in contrast, has 
pursued a long-term strategy 
with active public policies since 
the early 1980s, with special 
emphasis on industry, trade, 
regional development, education, 
innovation, urbanization, 
exchange rate and fiscal 
policy.  comparatively, china’s 
socioeconomic performance has 
been outstanding.  in 1980-2010, 
china’s gdp increased 14 times 
more than mexico’s.  china was 
able to lift more than 400 million 
inhabitants out of poverty, while 
mexico’s poverty rate increased 
during the same period.  in 2010, 
china exported $45.6 billion worth 
of goods to mexico, while mexican 
exports to china totaled $17.9 
billion, a difference of 155%.
china has become mexico’s 
second largest trading partner.  
mexico and China: Competition  
vs. Complementarity
By Enrique Dussel Peters
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The average annual growth rate 
(aagr) of mexico’s total exports 
during 1995-2010 was 9.2%, and 
10% for total imports.  The aagr 
of its trade with china, however, 
was 37.1% (exports) and 34.7% 
(imports).  as a result, the united 
states’ share of mexico’s trade is the 
lowest it has ever been. 
another relevant feature of 
mexico’s trade with china is its 
11:1 import/export ratio.  in 
other words, mexico has a massive 
trade deficit with china.  The 
composition of mexico’s trade with 
china is also significant.  until 
2006-2007, electronics, auto parts 
and automobiles accounted for 
more than two-thirds of mexican 
exports to china. This proportion 
has changed drastically, and by 
2010 copper, oil and other raw 
materials had displaced these 
products.  in turn, mexico imports 
almost exclusively manufactured 
goods from china, particularly 
electronics, auto parts and 
other increasingly sophisticated 
technological goods. 
recent research has also found 
that only 9% of mexican imports 
from china in 2010 were in 
the form of consumer goods.  
The overwhelming bulk was 
intermediate and capital goods.  
The figures require more analysis, 
but they appear to contradict the 
perception that chinese imports 
compete massively with domestic 
production and suggest that they 
could, on the contrary, improve 
the competitiveness of the mexican 
production sector. 
trade issues, including the 
trade deficit, trade and non-trade 
barriers, tariffs and similar issues, 
increasingly define mexico’s overall 
bilateral relationship with china. 
total chinese imports, for example, 
pay effective tariffs of 1.89% – 
more than total mexican imports, 
which pay 0.80% – while a small 
group of 204 items paid a tariff of 
106% in 2008 and a maximum of 
35% in 2012. 
tensions between the two 
countries, escalating with the 
ah1n1 virus in 2009, the visit 
of the dalai lama in 2011, and 
declarations by mexican and 
chinese officials since then, 
have limited new chinese fdi 
in mexico.  The economic 
commission for latin america and 
the caribbean (eclac) estimated 
total chinese fdi in latin america 
at around $35 billion in 2010-
2011, but mexico accounted for 
less than $100 million. 
to inaugurate a new stage in the 
bilateral relationship, the public, 
private and academic sectors 
must work together to establish 
priorities.  it is not clear that latin 
american and mexican elites have 
a sense of urgency regarding trade 
with china; they may require 
another decade or so to understand 
and analyze the issue.  urgent 
high-level political support will 
be required to overcome existing 
institutional, economic and 
political limitations and avoid an 
escalation of tensions that could 
result in an impasse. ■
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Asian Globalization and Latin America 
Project at FIU 
The Asian Globalization and Latin America Project (AGLA) at 
FIU is an innovative trans-regional program that combines an 
academic certificate program, faculty development, Chinese and 
Japanese language programs and study abroad opportunities.  
AGLA, originally funded by a grant from Department of 
Education, links two major regional programs at FIU:  the 
prestigious Title VI National Resource Center of the Latin 
American and Caribbean Center (LACC) and Asian Studies.
AGLA focuses on establishing and examining points of 
intersection between the regions of Asia and Latin America by 
analyzing issues such as diaspora/migration patterns; religion 
and cultural/national identity; trade/political economy; systems 
of education and reform; environmental/labor issues; and 
Internet commerce/technology. 
For more information, visit http://casgroup.fiu.edu/asian
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Cuba and China:  
In mixed enterprise We trust
By Adrian H. Hearn
a
s the cuban 
government eases 
restrictions on 
small trade and 
commerce, nobody 
is exploring new opportunities 
more actively than the island’s 
chinese community.  like the 
chinese diaspora across latin 
america, its members are seeking a 
head start by pursuing new sources 
of investment and trade with 
globally minded entrepreneurs in 
mainland china.  The community 
is small; its coordinating body, the 
casino chung Wah, registered 171 
surviving first-generation chinese 
in cuba in 2011.  altogether, 
however, havana’s 13 chinese 
ethnic associations boast some 
3,000 second- and third-generation 
members of mixed ancestry who 
are well integrated into cuban 
economic and political life and eager 
China’s Vice-President Xi Jinping shakes hands with Cuban President Raúl Castro on June 5, 2011 at Revolution Palace in Havana. Xi was in Cuba 
on a four-day official visit. China, Cuba’s second largest trading partner after Venezuela and a key source of credit, has investments in transportation, oil, 
appliances, communications and tourism in the communist-ruled island. ALEJANDRo ERNESTo/AFP/Getty Images.
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to build commercial bridges across 
the pacific.
in January 2012, the 125th 
anniversary of havana’s min chih 
tang association brought aspiring 
chinese-cuban entrepreneurs 
together with potential business 
partners from china who are 
exploring the frontiers of the island’s 
evolving economic landscape and 
hoping to introduce supermarkets, 
electronics outlets and tourism 
services as they have across the 
caribbean and southeast asia.  
tight restrictions have inhibited 
their expansion into cuba, but they 
are confident this will change under 
raúl castro’s reform agenda.  if they 
are correct, then the connections 
and trust they are forging with 
cuba’s chinese community will 
serve them well.
as much as they would like to 
broker trade with their motherland, 
cuba’s chinese associations must 
be careful not to overstep their 
bounds.  regulated by the ministry 
of Justice since 1978, they are 
required to focus on cultural 
activities.  The government tends to 
view the success of the associations’ 
restaurants (each of which earns 
between $3,000-$5,000 per day, 
the author found in 2011 and 
2012), with a blend of admiration 
and suspicion.  The main thing, 
says the ministry’s director of 
associations, miriam garcía, is that 
cuban grassroots institutions respect 
the country’s law of association, 
which since 1888 has ensured 
state oversight of their finances.  
“Without this guidance,” she 
believes, “the chinese associations 
would become overwhelmed by 
commercial aspirations.  We trust 
them to openly comply, and in 
return they trust us to look after 
their bank accounts.”
trust between state and society 
has long been a topic of debate in 
cuba, particularly with regard to 
the “social contract” that since 1959 
has guaranteed citizens access to 
basic goods and services.  Just as 
deng Xiaoping abandoned china’s 
“iron rice bowl” in the 1980s, the 
situation in cuba is changing.  
guaranteed rights to employment 
and housing are “melting into air” 
as the state gradually relieves itself of 
half a million employees and permits 
citizens to buy and sell houses and 
cars.  The 313 social and economic 
policy guidelines published in 2011 
show growing acceptance of market 
forces as a “complement” to cuba’s 
state-dominated system of trade and 
investment.  The aim is to develop 
an economy that is less dependent 
on the state but nevertheless serves 
national interests, and a citizenry 
that trusts the political stewardship 
of its government.  
in attempting to introduce a 
more mixed economy, raúl castro 
appears to have taken a page from 
deng’s book.  among the insights 
derived from china — with varying 
degrees of attentiveness — are 
the gradual implementation of 
reforms under a state-appointed 
permanent commission for 
implementation and development; 
military management of commercial 
activities; coordinated upgrades 
of industrial sectors; trial runs 
of reforms prior to wider 
implementation; and a more 
conciliatory approach to emigrants 
as a source of much-needed 
investment.  in november 2010, 
cuban national assembly president 
ricardo alarcón visited Beijing and 
officially recognized the relevance 
of china’s economic evolution for 
cuba’s development.  raúl castro 
had already expressed this sentiment 
during his visits in 1997 and 2005, 
which focused on labor market 
reform and the creation of hybrid 
public-private enterprise. 
chinese officials have been 
advocating economic liberalization 
to their cuban counterparts ever 
since fidel castro visited Beijing 
in 1995.  cuba has good reason to 
listen:  china is now the country’s 
second largest trading partner after 
Venezuela, with annual bilateral 
trade of $1.83 billion in 2010 
(down from a high of $2.27 billion 
in 2008, before the global financial 
crisis, and up from just $314 
million in 2000).  The increase in 
trade has been accompanied by 
closer political ties.  in June 2011, 
chinese Vice president Xi Jinping 
and china national petroleum 
corporation president Jiang 
Jiemin visited havana to establish 
the first five-Year plan for sino-
cuban cooperation.  among the 
initiatives under negotiation are 
chinese investments in cuban oil 
and gas; expansion of academic 
exchange programs (which currently 
accommodate some 100 cuban 
and 2,000 chinese students); and 
assembly of low-cost televisions, 
air conditioners and kitchen 
appliances.  other proposals include 
direct china air flights between 
havana and Beijing, and credits and 
loans for cuba’s emerging market 
economy.
china’s political attaché in 
havana, Yu Bo, believes that 
special focus
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sino-cuban cooperation will 
require a careful balance of 
market entrepreneurship and state 
supervision if it is to fulfill its 
potential.  “market-led systems 
demand business acumen, and state-
led systems demand intelligence; we 
need both,” he has said.  industrial 
upgrading, tourism development, 
and financial services require 
creativity and initiative, but they 
also call for long-term planning and 
regulatory oversight.  With china’s 
support, cuba now appears to be 
on track toward a more effective 
balance of the two. 
in the wake of the soviet collapse, 
francis fukuyama famously argued 
that the key to prosperity lies in 
spontaneous trust among citizens 
and entrepreneurship uninhibited by 
state intervention.  since the global 
financial crisis, world leaders from 
hu Jintao to Barack obama have 
questioned the wisdom of the small 
government thesis, but cuba’s 
reformers may yet find a pearl of 
wisdom in fukuyama’s thinking.  
if their efforts to blend private 
enterprise with public oversight 
are to succeed, regulations must be 
developed to encourage rather than 
impede local initiative and trust.  
havana’s chinese associations 
demonstrate what is at stake.  Their 
efforts to foment cooperation and 
trust with business partners across 
the pacific could open valuable 
commercial channels for the 
island.  The key question on their 
members’ minds is whether or not 
the cuban government will trust 
them to do so. ■
Adrian H. Hearn is an Australian 
Research Council Future Fellow 
specializing in international relations 
at the University of Sydney China 
Studies Centre.  He is editor of “China 
Engages Latin America: Tracing the 
Trajectory” (2011, Lynne Rienner).
Members of the Chinese community in Cuba wave farewell to China’s President Hu Jintao during his departure from the José Martí International 
Airport in Havana on November 19, 2008. China’s President Hu wrapped up a landmark visit to Cuba, where he brought millions of dollars in aid and 
promises of closer trade ties. JUAN CARLoS BoRJAS/AFP/Getty Images.
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Until 1971, the government of the republic of china (roc) occupied china’s seat on 
the un security council.  When 
chiang Kai-shek retreated in 1949 
from nanjing after mao Zedong 
and his communist troops defeated 
the Kuomintang, only members 
of the soviet camp recognized 
the newly proclaimed people’s 
republic of china (prc).  sweden, 
denmark and switzerland followed 
suit one year later, but for the next 
20 years the rest of the Western 
world would recognize the roc, 
based in taiwan, as the legitimate 
government of china.  france was 
the first major Western country 
to recognize Beijing, exchanging 
ambassadors in 1965.  others soon 
followed its example and in 1971, 
following Washington’s recognition 
of the prc, Beijing went on to 
occupy china’s un seat. 
today only 23 countries, 12 
of them in latin american and 
the caribbean, still recognize the 
roc.  These are, in alphabetical 
order:  Belize, dominican republic, 
el salvador, guatemala, haiti, 
honduras, nicaragua, panama, 
paraguay, saint christopher and 
nevis, saint lucia, and saint 
Vincent and the grenadines.  
however, taiwan’s status in the 
world’s economy – nineteenth 
according to gdp, seventeenth 
major exporter and sixteenth major 
importer – creates ambiguous 
situations for most countries in the 
Western hemisphere, including the 
united states.  taiwan’s democratic 
consolidation, clearly demonstrated 
during the last presidential election, 
further complicates the matter of 
diplomatic recognition.
Beijing insists that countries 
cannot have official relations with 
both china and taiwan.  to deal 
with this challenge, taiwan has 
established a pragmatic alternative 
system of “external relations” 
that allows it to conduct formal 
business with most countries of the 
world.  in 1979, for example, the 
us congress passed the taiwan 
relations act authorizing official 
relations with the “governing 
authorities on taiwan” and 
honoring the validity of all previous 
obligations contracted with the 
roc.  us law treats taiwan the 
same way it does any “foreign 
countries, nations, states, 
governments, or similar entities.”  
canada, argentina, Brazil, chile, 
colombia, ecuador, mexico and 
peru all have thriving commercial 
relations with the island managed 
by trade offices in lieu of full-
fledged embassies.  the Brazilian 
government recently announced 
that foxconn, the taiwanese 
multinational electronics 
manufacturer, plans to build five 
new apple ipad assembly plants 
in its territory.  final negotiations 
with the company were held on 
the mainland, where foxconn 
has most of its factories, during 
president dilma rousseff ’s official 
visit to china. 
after years of tense relations, 
Beijing and taipei have found 
a productive modus vivendi. 
taiwan: more than  
Checkbook diplomacy
By Cristina Eguizábal
Members of the Taiwanese community take part in the commemorative parade for Taiwan’s 100th 
anniversary in Guatemala City on August 7, 2011. JoHAN oRDoNEZ/AFP/Getty Images.
r e p o r t s :  o t h e r  p L a Y e r s
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Anti-China activists carry a banner as they march through the Taipei streets 
on September 4, 2011. About 1,000 activists chanting pro-independence 
slogans took to the streets, accusing Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou 
of surrendering the island’s sovereignty to former bitter rival China. 
PATRICK LIN/AFP/Getty Images.
mainland china is taiwan’s most 
important trading partner and 
taiwan is china’s most important 
foreign investor.  With seven 
million visits annually across the 
taiwan strait, the two societies 
have become economically 
integrated.  despite all the 
advances, however, the relationship 
is still a work in progress.  
during the cold War, taiwan 
played an important role in training 
central american soldiers after 
the carter administration 
asked congress to cut off 
military assistance to the 
repressive governments of 
guatemala, el salvador 
and somoza’s nicaragua.  
taiwan no longer provides 
such military assistance 
but it still participates in 
military student exchanges.  
development aid is 
aligned with millennium 
development objectives 
and disbursed through the 
international cooperation 
and development fund.  
taiwanese cooperation 
focuses on strengthening the 
private sector, particularly 
small and medium enterprises, 
through technical assistance in 
communications and information 
technology, development of human 
capital and access to credit.  it 
also supplies medical assistance 
after humanitarian disasters.  less 
transparent and more questionable 
are cash donations for housing 
projects and fancy government 
buildings. 
taiwanese diplomacy is not 
confined to the checkbook.  The 
island is also aggressively pursuing 
free trade agreements.  it finalized 
negotiations with panama in 2003, 
guatemala in 2005, nicaragua 
in 2006, and el salvador and 
honduras in 2007, and is 
negotiating an accord with the 
dominican republic.  to facilitate 
taiwanese private investment 
overseas, taipei has established a 
$250 million fund to encourage 
taiwanese companies, a central 
and south american research 
center, and several investment 
consulting missions.  The island 
holds observer status at the system 
for integration of central america 
(sica) and the central american 
parliament (parlacen) and 
is an extra-regional member of 
the central american Bank for 
economic integration (Bcie) and 
inter-american development Bank 
(iadB). 
The role of taiwanese non-
governmental organizations is 
also rapidly expanding.  The tzu 
chi Buddhist foundation, a 
humanitarian organization, operates 
offices in asunción, san salvador, 
santo domingo, guatemala city, 
tijuana, mexicali, são paulo and 
Buenos aires. 
until recently, Beijing had 
not expressed much interest in 
competing with taipei for the small 
central american and caribbean 
markets.  This has been slowly 
changing and the prc has begun 
competing with taipei in dollar 
terms –and often outbidding it.  
dominica switched recognition 
in 2004 after Beijing offered it 
us$112 million over six years, 
dwarfing taipei’s us$9 million 
assistance.  in 2005, the prc won 
grenada’s diplomatic recognition by 
offering to build 2,000 low-income 
houses and new hospital facilities, 
support the agricultural sector, 
transfer us$1 million in cash for 
grenadian government 
scholarships, replace 
taiwan’s us$6 million 
donation to complete 
community projects, and 
provide budget support 
until 2009.  in addition, 
Beijing promised financial 
assistance to rebuild 
grenada’s national 
stadium for the 2007 
cricket World cup.  
Before recognizing Beijing, 
costa rica insisted that 
it buy us$300 million 
in state bonds, provide 
us$130 million in aid 
plus scholarships for study in china 
and, most conspicuously, contribute 
us$74 million to build the capital’s 
new soccer stadium.
nobody doubts that time is on 
Beijing’s side.  in the meantime, 
however, self-determination remains 
crucial for taiwan, and anything 
that can foster the legitimacy of 
its claims to sovereignty is key.  
The small central american and 
caribbean countries are important 
pieces on the chessboard. ■ 
Cristina Eguizábal is a professor 
of international relations and the 
director of the Latin American 
and Caribbean Center at Florida 
International University.
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r
elations between 
Japan and latin 
america in 
general receive 
little attention 
from domestic or international 
observers.  Japanese overtures 
have been cautious due to the 
importance attached to Japan’s 
strategic alliance with the united 
states.  on both sides of the 
pacific ocean, however, key 
actors agree that the world is 
living through times of dramatic 
change that will eventually define 
the future world order.  Both 
Japan and latin america share 
some common concerns – as well 
as expectations – regarding the 
impact these changes may have on 
their interests in the international 
arena in terms of political and 
economic power.  for the powerful 
east asian nation, the whole of 
latin america is “a continent in 
transition,” as the title of a recent 
issue of the journal of the Japanese 
international cooperation agency 
(Jica) proclaims.  a great deal 
of the differentiation tokyo has 
shown in its bilateral relations  
has to do with its understanding  
of the nature of this transition.
new pillars of Cooperation
several factors help illuminate 
the complex dynamics of Japanese 
involvement in latin america.  
first, and most important, Japan 
Japan and Latin america:  
new patterns in  
Bilateral relations
By Vladimir Rouvinski
A rescuer from the Mexican Red Cross searches for bodies with a dog in Sendai on March 16, 
2011, days after a massive earthquake and tsunami devastated the coast of eastern Japan. FRED 
DUFoUR/AFP/Getty Images.
reports
is facing an identity crisis over 
its future.  only recently, many 
considered the country to be the 
leading rival to united states 
power, and the government’s 
capacity to assure a bright future 
for its citizens was seldom 
questioned.  The march 2011 
earthquake and tsunami, however, 
caused damage not only to the 
country’s infrastructure and 
environment but also to the 
confidence of the Japanese people 
in their government.  debate has 
intensified about domestic as well 
as foreign policy.  While it is true 
that latin america has not been 
at the center of these debates, 
the outcome will have an impact 
on Japanese foreign policy in the 
Western hemisphere.  after all, 
the key issues at the top of foreign 
policy debates in Japan –namely, 
the demise of us hegemonic power 
and the rise of china – are familiar 
topics in latin america. 
There is no doubt that Japan 
is closely watching the changing 
patterns of relationships in 
the Western hemisphere and, 
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especially, the rise of emerging 
actors from asia, such as china 
and india.  These developments 
are moving Japan away from 
its traditional appreciation of 
multilateral cooperation agreements 
and toward the promotion of 
regionalism.  since signing the 
trans-pacific economic partnership 
agreement (epa) with mexico in 
2004, tokyo has forged similar 
agreements with chile, colombia 
and peru.  nevertheless, the 
itineraries of high-level Japanese 
officials continue to exclude 
most latin american countries.  
in 2000-2010, Japanese prime 
ministers visited only those 
countries with an established 
history of relations with Japan, 
namely, Brazil, peru and mexico.  
The majority of latin american 
presidents, in contrast, paid 
personal visits to tokyo. 
trade, Investment and 
International Cooperation
latin american presidents’ 
willingness to travel long distances 
is easy to explain:  Japan is one 
of the most promising foreign 
investors in the region and its 
foreign direct investment (fdi) in 
latin america and the caribbean is 
second only to its fdi in asia.  The 
first Japanese investments in latin 
america date back to the 1950s and 
1960s, but only since the beginning 
of the twenty-first century have 
changes in the investment policies 
of the large Japanese general trading 
companies paved the way for the 
appreciation of new opportunities 
in latin america.  
currently, the mining sector is 
the driving force for major Japanese 
investments in the region, in 
addition to the automobile and 
electronics industries in the case 
of Brazil and mexico.  These new 
Japanese investments are possible 
because tokyo has started to 
consider the region’s long-term 
stability, and the promotion of 
democratic regimes and market 
economies, as key elements of its 
foreign policy in latin america.  
to this end, Japan has adopted 
the “two ds” – democracy 
and development – and is 
actively fomenting international 
cooperation, after having been a 
leading donor for decades. 
By 2010, Japanese exports to 
latin america and the caribbean 
had reached us$31.4 billion, an 
increase of 34.8% in just five years 
and the highest growth of Japanese 
exports anywhere in the world.  
Japan’s imports from the region 
also grew, to us$18.6 billion, an 
increase of 26.3% over 2005. 
“Things happen for a reason” is 
a favorite Japanese saying.  one 
of the reasons for the success of 
Japanese trade and investment in 
latin america is the existence of an 
environment of trust and mutual 
respect in bilateral relations.  This 
climate is the result of a long 
history of peaceful and mutually 
beneficial relations dating back as 
long as 400 years, in the case of 
mexico.  new developments have 
also played a role.  emergency aid 
from latin america was mostly 
symbolic following the 2011 
tsunami, but it highlighted an 
important feature of current latin 
american relations with Japan:  the 
existence of a human bond between 
these two geographically distant 
parts of the world.
a people’s Connection
shortly after the quake and 
tsunami hit eastern Japan, the 
Japanese consulate in rio de 
Janeiro opened its phone lines for 
inquires.  in a few short hours, 
the Brazilian ministry for external 
relations received about 4000 
e-mails and phone calls from 
people with relatives in Japan.  
Brazilians are the largest expatriate 
community in Japan, second only 
to chinese and Korean immigrants. 
The 1.5 million nipo-brasileiros 
represent a strong link between the 
two countries. 
until only recently, discussions 
about the significance of emigrant 
groups in Japan would likely 
have focused on the amount 
of cash they sent back to the 
americas.  in some cases, 
remittances reach several billion 
dollars and could be compared to 
the amount of Japanese exports 
to the region.  The response to 
the 2011 earthquake, however, 
revealed some new features in 
the relationship.  organized 
latin american communities in 
Japan are becoming increasingly 
visible and are attempting to 
promote a positive image.  in 
the aftermath of the fukushima 
disaster, Brazilian groups from 
across Japan formed a volunteer 
organization called Brasil Solidário 
to provide assistance to the 
devastated areas.  a few months 
later, Kawamata township, which 
lies partially within the nuclear 
no-entry zone, hosted Cosquín en 
Japón, named after the famous 
festival in argentina and said to 
be the largest latin american 
event in Japan.  cultural and 
community events and activities 
are proliferating across the country 
and helping to build a positive 
image of latin america among 
the Japanese, contributing to 
the development of stronger ties 
between the two regions. ■ 
Vladimir Rouvinski is director of 
the CIES Research Center at Icesi 
University in Cali, Colombia.  He 
studies Asian countries and Russia’s 
relations with Latin America.
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new from Cambridge university press
from the Great Wall to the new World:   
China and Latin America in the 21st Century
edited by Julia c. strauss and ariel c. armony 
cambridge university press, forthcoming may 2012
From the Great Wall to the New World:  China and Latin America in the 21st 
Century goes beyond policy analysis and examines a wide range of “new” 
interactions between china and latin america.  authors discuss transnational 
flows of capital and people, fluidity of perceptions between china and latin 
america, stereotypes and “othering” of latin america within china, and 
changing rhetorical assumptions of the top leadership for the china-latin 
america relationship.  With its base of primary source material from mexico, 
peru, colombia, Brazil and china, From the Great Wall to the New World:  
China and Latin America in the 21st Century makes an important contribution 
to the small but emerging body of academic scholarship on china and 
latin america and provides the reader with unique insight into an evolving 
relationship worth watching.
Julia C. Strauss is Senior 
Lecturer in Chinese Politics 
in the Department of Politics 
and International Studies 
and a member of the Centre 
of Chinese Studies at the 
University of London.
Ariel C. Armony is Weeks 
Professor in Latin American 
Studies, Professor of 
International Studies and 
Director of the Center for 
Latin American Studies 
(CLAS) at the University of 
Miami. 
PoLItIcs And InternAtIonAL reLAtIons In 
ArGentInA 2012
LACC’s Politics & International Relations in Argentina study 
abroad program is an intensive 4-week program designed to foster 
an understanding of Latin American international relations and 
society through the experience of living and studying in one of 
the most vibrant cosmopolitan cities in the Americas. Open to 
both undergraduate and graduate students, the program takes an 
interdisciplinary approach to the study of the region. 
dAtes
June 25-July 20, 2012
coUrses
International Relations of Latin America 
Argentine Politics, Society, History and Culture
ProGrAM InForMAtIon 
Latin American and Caribbean Center 
MMC-DM 353 
Miami, FL
305-348-2894 
http://lacc.fiu.edu
HAItIAn sUMMer InstItUte 2012
Now entering its 15th year, LACC’s Haitian Summer Institute 
is a six-week program designed for anyone interested in 
acquiring basic conversational proficiency in Haitian Creole 
and also for students who wish to continue their Haitian 
Creole language training at intermediate and advanced levels.
Participants are introduced to Haitian history and culture 
through lectures presented by renowned Haitianists and 
Diasporic leaders, film, technical training sessions and tours 
of Miami’s Little Haiti neighborhood. The institute is held in 
Miami, home to a vibrant Haitian community.
dAtes 
July 2-August 10, 2012
coUrses
Accelerated Beginning Haitian Creole
Accelerated Intermediate Haitian Creole
Advanced Haitian Creole/Haiti: Language & Culture
ProGrAM InForMAtIon 
Latin American and Caribbean Center 
MMC-DM 353 
Miami, FL
305-348-2894 
http://lacc.fiu.edu
L Ac c sUMMer Pro Gr AMs
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In search of Balance,   
Brazil Looks to asia
By Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida
B
razil has had established 
relations with asia 
since the beginning 
of the twentieth 
century, when waves of 
Japanese immigrants founded the 
largest Japanese community outside 
Japan.  These immigrants played an 
important role in creating a modern 
and productive agricultural sector, 
especially – but not only – in the 
green belt surrounding metropolitan 
são paulo.  The Japanese fully 
integrated into Brazilian society, 
experiencing a successful upward 
mobility.  Their descendants – 
known as niseis, sanseis or Yonseis 
– are today an integral part of the 
nation and its multiethnic elite.  
The late 1950s and 60s brought 
Japanese investment as part of 
Brazil’s efforts to become an 
industrialized country.  Korean 
firms followed in the late 1970s 
and 80s, contributing to the 
development of the electronics 
industry.  in both cases, Brazil’s 
import substitution policies, aimed 
at boosting national production of 
industrial goods for the growing 
domestic market, were crucial in 
attracting Japanese and Korean 
firms.  today, two Japanese and 
one Korean firm are among Brazil’s 
50 largest enterprises.  Japan and 
Korea are also among the country’s 
10 most important trading partners 
(see table 1).
if Japanese and Korean 
investments are a chapter in 
the history of Brazil’s state-led 
and internal market-centered 
industrialization, chinese 
participation is much more recent 
and stems from dramatic changes 
in the south american country’s 
economic policies.  since 1990, 
cautious market-oriented reforms 
and moderate and selective 
liberalization of international trade, 
aimed at deepening integration into 
the global economy, have replaced 
import substitution as the main 
strategy for economic growth.  
Brazil’s international trade grew 
steadily and the country became 
a fully global player.  in 2011, 
china surpassed the united states 
as the most important market for 
Brazilian imports, as table 1 shows.  
Brazil provides commodities to 
china and buys its manufactured 
products.
The increasing importance of 
china for Brazil’s international 
trade and the nature of the 
exchange have resulted in some 
domestic tension.  Brazilian 
industrialists fear competition 
from chinese industrial goods and 
have asked for market protection.  
analysts and scholars of nationalist 
persuasion have warned that what 
they call unfair competition from 
chinese goods risks ruining Brazil’s 
industrial sector.
although trade is central to 
Brazil’s relations with china, more 
An elderly woman, known as a ‘Nisei’ in Brazil – a second generation Brazilian-Japanese – walks past 
a graffiti-marked wall in Liberdade, a central São Paulo neighborhood that has the feel of a Little Tokyo 
because of its high concentration of Japanese descendants. MARC BURLEIGH/AFP/Getty Images. 
reports
Hemisphere Volume 21 29
than trade is involved.  since at 
least 2002, Brazil’s foreign policy 
has emphasized south-south 
relations to make the country 
not only a global trader but also 
a global player.  south-south 
cooperation is meant to soft-
balance the great powers, especially 
the united states, and widen spaces 
for emerging middle powers such 
as Brazil.  accordingly, Brazil voted 
in favor of china’s application to 
join the World trade organization 
(Wto), which entailed recognition 
of china as a market economy, 
and the two countries established 
the high level chinese-Brazilian 
commission for coordination and 
cooperation in 2004.  The new 
chinese ambassador to Brazil is 
said to be the third man in the 
chinese foreign affairs hierarchy, 
a demonstration of the importance 
that china assigns its relations 
with Brazil.  in turn, Brazil 
expects chinese recognition and 
support for its aspiration to play 
a greater role in the international 
arena, and especially its demand 
for a permanent seat on the un 
security council.
Brazil has tried to further 
strengthen ties with asia and, 
in particular, with india and 
Chinese Vice Prime Minister Wang Qishan and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff talk during a meeting at Planalto Palace in Brasilia, on February 13, 
2012. Wang was in Brazil to participate in the Second Plenary Session of the Chinese-Brazilian High-Level Concertation and Cooperation Commission 
(CoSBAN). EVARISTo SA/AFP/Getty Images.
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Table 1.  Source: MIDC, Brazil, 2012.
BRAZIL FOREIGN TRADE MOST IMPORTANT PARTNERS 2011
USA (15.1% )
CHINA (14% )
ARGENTINA (7.6%)
GERMANY (6.7%)
SOUTH KOREA (4.7%)
NIGERIA (4.4%)
JAPAN (3.8%)
ITALY (2.7%)
INDIA (2.4%)
FRANCE (2.4%)
CHILE (2.2%)
MEXICO (2.2%)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
9.
10.
10.
CHINA (16.9% )
USA (9.9%)
ARGENTINA (8.8%)
NETHERLANDS( 5.6%)
GERMANY (3.8%)
JAPAN (3.5%)
RUSSIA (2.5%)
CHILE (2.3%)
ITALY (2.3%)
SPAIN (2.1%)
UNITED KINGDOM (1.9%)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
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Table 2. Source: Las Américas y El Mundo Database.  
south africa, through the india-
Brazil-south africa dialogue 
forum, and it advanced coalition-
building efforts during agriculture 
negotiations in the doha round 
at the Wto.  Brazilian researchers 
amancio de oliveira and Janina 
onuki have shown, however, that 
while defensive coalitions against 
the developed countries worked 
well, important differences regarding 
indian and Brazilian agriculture 
interests still hinder concerted pro-
active behavior at the Wto.
data from surveys of Brazilian 
elites as part of the international 
collaborative project “las américas 
y el mundo” reveal the importance 
these groups ascribe to asian 
countries and their support for 
a south-south strategy.  table 2 
lists the countries that respondents 
considered vital to Brazilian interests 
around the world. Three of six 
countries with the highest scores 
are asian.  fifty-six percent of those 
interviewed think that trade with 
south america and large developing 
countries such as china, india and 
south africa should have priority, 
against 19% who say that priority 
should be given to trade with the 
developed north (united states, 
europe and Japan).
in brief, Brazil today looks to 
asia in search of markets for its 
goods as well as partners in its push 
for a more balanced multipolar 
international system with greater 
room for emerging countries.  This 
strategy is not merely a government 
policy but a more permanent state 
policy, widely supported by Brazilian 
elites.  tensions will emerge and 
differences will appear, but the result 
will be an open process that depends 
as much on changes in the structure 
of the international system as on the 
policy choices of emerging countries 
in asia and south america. ■
Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida is 
Professor of Political Science and Dean 
of the Institute of International Relations 
at University of São Paulo, Brazil.
Indian Foreign Minister S. M. Krishna and 
Brazilian Minister of External Relations Antonio 
de Aguiar Patriota shake hands prior to a meeting 
in New Delhi on December 12, 2011 during an 
official visit by a Brazilian delegation to India. 
PRAKASH SINGH/AFP/Getty Images.
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BRAZIL’S GEOPOLITICAL PRIORITIES
 (Responses to the question, “In which of the following 
countries does Brazil have vital interest?”
United States
China
Argentina
India
Japan
Germany
Cuba
Israel
Iran
Indonesia
Costa Rica
Honduras
Has vital interest
Does not have
vital interest
7
8
10
19
23
25
53
59
63
64
75
74
93
91
90
79
77
75
46
40
37
35
23
23
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The new India and the 
new Latin america
By Jorge Heine
c
hile is widely 
considered to be 
one of the most 
internationally 
oriented and 
cosmopolitan countries in latin 
america.  With a 95% literacy 
rate, one of the world’s most open 
economies and an export-driven 
economic development model, it 
is often mentioned as one of the 
developing countries that have 
made the most of globalization.  to 
do so, it has relied on its unique 
“lateral” international trade policy.  
By signing free trade agreements 
(ftas) with as many countries 
as possible (59 as of this writing), 
chile has gained preferential access 
to the world’s leading markets.  
chile’s exports grew eight-fold from 
1990 to 2010, from us$9 billion to 
some us$70 billion.  many of these 
efforts at opening up new markets 
have been directed at asia.  Yet, 
amazing as it may sound, until 2005 
– 58 years into indian independence 
– no chilean president had ever 
visited india.  forty-six years 
went by between the first visit 
by a chilean foreign minister to 
india (in 1957) and the second (in 
2003).  mutual indifference cannot 
explain this long gap:  indian prime 
minister indira gandhi paid a state 
visit to chile in 1968, and president 
shankar dayal sharma visited the 
country in 1995. 
The chilean example may be 
extreme, but it is by no means 
an isolated case.  for the first 50 
years of indian independence, the 
subcontinent hardly seemed to 
exist for latin america, and vice-
versa.  india and latin america were 
not only far apart geographically 
and culturally; they also belonged 
to different “clubs.”  once a part 
of the British empire, india is a 
member of the commonwealth 
and the non-aligned movement 
(nam).  as former spanish or 
portuguese colonies, latin american 
countries deployed their multilateral 
efforts within entities such as the 
organization of american states 
(oas) and, more recently, the 
ibero-american summits.  With the 
exception of cuba, latin american 
countries largely stayed away from 
the nam.  even asian-american 
organizations that crossed the pacific 
divide, such as the asia pacific 
economic cooperation (apec) 
forum, did not include india. 
fast-forward to 2012.  over the 
course of the past decade, indo-
latin american relations (indo-
lac, for short) have flourished.  
The number of latin american and 
caribbean embassies in new delhi 
has increased from 12 in 2002 to 18 
in 2012, and the number of indian 
embassies based in the lac region 
has doubled, from seven to 14 in 
the same period.  only 10 latin 
american presidents visited india 
from 1947 to 2000, but 12 did so 
from 2000 to 2011.  Brazil’s lula 
visited india three times during his 
eight years in office, on one occasion 
as india’s chief guest on republic 
day, one of the highest honors the 
indian government bestows on 
visiting heads of state.  similarly, 
after a long period of apparent 
diplomatic indifference, three state 
visits took place between chilean 
and indian presidents in just four 
years:  ricardo lagos to india 
(January 2005); pratibha patil to 
chile (april 2008); and michelle 
Bachelet to india (march 2009).  
far from being pro forma exercises 
in diplomatic protocol, these were 
all substantial meetings.  The 
chilean presidents stayed in india 
for five days, stretching the limit 
for state visits, and president patil, 
india’s first female head of state, 
included the stop in chile as part of 
her first trip abroad.
What happened?  The easy answer 
is what the indian press refers to as 
“the global indian takeover,” by 
which it means the emergence of 
the new india in the new century.  
This is only partly correct.  far from 
being a mere reflection of the so-
called “indian miracle,” the upsurge 
in indo-lac ties reflects not just 
the emergence of a new india, but 
also that of a new latin america.  
leaving behind the inward-oriented, 
protectionist strategies of the past, 
india and many latin american 
countries have opened up their 
economies, embraced export-led 
development and, in the process, 
discovered the enormous mutual 
opportunities this entails.
a Burgeoning trade
one example is the increase in 
trade between india and latin 
america, which totaled around 
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us$23 billion in 2011 (up from a 
meager us$500 million in 1990).  
india has also invested some us$12 
billion in the region since 2000.  
as graph 1 indicates, this trade 
is quite concentrated, with chile, 
Brazil, argentina and paraguay 
providing the bulk of exports to 
india, and Brazil, peru, colombia 
and nicaragua accounting for a 
significant amount of imports.  
preferential trade agreements 
(ptas) with chile and mercosur 
have helped.  chilean exports to 
india grew tenfold from 2003 to 
2007, reaching us$2.2 billion.  
indo-lac trade is projected to 
grow by 20% (approximately us$5 
billion) in 2012, with indo-Brazilian 
trade alone expected to reach us$11 
billion, up from us$9.2 billion 
in 2011.  as one indian diplomat 
put it, “indian companies will 
target latin america even more 
vigorously in 2012 to make up for 
the slow growth of exports to the 
developed markets.”  india is not 
the only country with this strategy; 
latin america’s trade with the rest 
of the world crossed the trillion-
dollar mark in 2011 and foreign 
direct investment (fdi) jumped to 
a record us$139 billion, up from 
us$75 billion in 2010.
indian companies investing 
in latin america include tata 
consulting services (it), 
dr. reddy’s laboratories 
(pharmaceuticals), united 
phosphorus (agrochemicals), shree 
sugars, havelis silvania (lighting 
equipment), Videcon (television), 
ongc Videsh (oil), and the godrej 
group (cosmetics).  Jindal steel and 
power has initiated a us$2.3 billion 
investment in Bolivia’s el mutún 
iron ore mine, the south american 
country’s biggest fdi project ever.  
in trinidad and tobago, essar steel 
is establishing a 2.5 million-ton steel 
plant.  in 2002, tata consulting 
set up a global delivery center in 
montevideo that put uruguay on 
the global it map.  some 35,000 
latin americans work for indian 
companies in the region, half of 
them for it and it-enabled service 
companies.  Though still on a small 
scale, there is little doubt that these 
investments have been an important 
addition to local economies, 
contributing valuable jobs skills and 
technology transfer.
India and China in Latin america
compared to sino-lac trade, 
valued at some us$140 billion in 
2010, india’s figures are relatively 
small.  some observers are skeptical 
of the possibility of a surge in indo-
lac trade and investment, but we 
must keep in mind that in 2000, 
sino-lac trade was around us$12 
billion.  The noted indian economist 
manmohan agarwal has pointed 
out that on a number of indicators 
(exports, openness of the economy, 
and outward-bound fdi), india lags 
some 10 to 12 years behind china, 
which is roughly the gap between 
the initiation of policy reforms 
and the respective opening of the 
chinese and indian economies.  if 
this is the case, by 2020 indian 
trade with latin american could 
very well cross the hundred billion 
dollar mark.  This is buttressed by 
projections indicating that india’s 
growth rate could be higher than 
china’s by then.
latin america, and in particular 
south america, is becoming 
a significant source of natural 
resources, such as oil, copper, soy 
and iron ore, for india as well 
as for china.  some observers 
warn that asian demand for these 
commodities could lead to the 
region’s de-industrialization.  This 
Naveen Jindal, Vice Chairman and Managing Director of Jindal Steel & Power Ltd., attends a session at the World Economic Forum’s India Economic 
Summit in New Delhi, India, on Nov. 15, 2010. Jindal is investing in iron ore in Bolivia. PRASHANTH VISHWANATHAN/BLooMBERG via 
Getty Images.
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need not be the case.  demand 
for food will continue to expand 
exponentially in india, a country 
with significant water scarcity.  latin 
america has around 30% of the 
world’s fresh water reserves, making 
it an agricultural powerhouse.  its 
producers may very well want to 
move up the value chain in this 
area and start to export more 
sophisticated farm products.  latin 
american industries also need to 
get into the asian value chains that 
have become such a critical part of 
international trade.
The indian and south american 
economies are among the fastest-
growing and best performing in the 
world today and they complement 
each other in many ways. despite 
geographic and cultural distance, 
these complementarities are coming 
to the fore.  There is still a long 
way to go to expand and facilitate 
trade and investment flows, but 
the challenge of making south-
south cooperation work is again at 
the top of the policy agenda – this 
time driven by sound economic 
opportunities rather than by 
wishful thinking. ■
Jorge Heine holds the CIGI Chair in 
Global Governance at the Balsillie 
School of International Affairs, 
Wilfrid Laurier University, in 
Waterloo, ontario. He served as 
Chile’s ambassador to India from 
2003 to 2007.  His book (with 
Andrew Cooper), “Which Way Latin 
America? Hemispheric Politics Meets 
Globalization,” is published by 
United Nations University Press.
Source: ECLAC (2011) India and 
Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Opportunities and Challenges in Trade 
and Investment Relations (Santiago: 
United Nations/ECLAC) LC/L3426, 
November, p. 39.
a  Data are not available for Antigua & 
Barbuda and Honduras from 2008; 
Saint Kitts & Nevis and Saint Lucia 
from 2009; or for Bahamas, Granada, 
Honduras, Saint Kitts & Nevis, 
Saint Lucia, Trinidad & Tobago and 
Uruguay from 2010.
b  Oil statistics were estimated by 
COMTRADE and may not be 
included for every country.
A. Imports         
Graph 1.  Latin America and the Caribbean: Relative Importance of India as a Trade Partner, Annual Average, 2008-2010
(Percentages of each country’s total exports and imports) a,b
  B. Exports
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south Korea and Latin america: 
In the dragon’s shadow
By Gonzalo Paz
a
long with their 
growing interest 
in china, latin 
american countries 
have expanded their 
relations with south Korea in recent 
years.  The country has gained a new 
prominence, with the 1988 olympics, 
hyundai and samsung gradually 
overshadowing lingering memories of 
the Korean War (to which colombia 
contributed troops).  The rise of 
china has diverted attention from this 
more established relationship, which 
has experienced quiet but steady 
growth.  shared values with regard 
to democracy and human rights 
underpin this relationship, as does a 
degree of economic complementarity.  
increased commercial exchanges 
and investment, free trade areas, 
broad technical cooperation and 
development aid form a solid 
foundation for continued growth, 
despite the competition from china. 
 Korea enjoys a trillion-dollar 
economy, per-capita income of more 
than $20,000 and average 7% annual 
growth.  as an advanced industrial 
country, it is an attractive partner 
for latin america.  in the last two 
decades, latin america’s trade with 
Korea grew 16% annually, less than 
trade with china (27.5%) but more 
than with the united states (7.4%), 
the european union (7.4%) or Japan 
(7.7%).  Bilateral trade between the 
region and Korea equals roughly $45 
billion dollars, 2.5% of total latin 
america trade (china now accounts 
for around 13%).  
The main Korean trade partners in 
the region are Brazil, chile, mexico, 
peru and argentina.  latin american 
exports are poorly diversified and 
remain concentrated in a few mining 
and agricultural products, which make 
up roughly 75% of the region’s total 
exports to Korea, just slightly more 
diversified than its exports to china.  
in the region, only peru, argentina, 
chile, panama, dominica and Bolivia 
enjoyed a trade surplus with Korea in 
2000-2009. 
if the 1980s were, economically 
speaking, a “lost decade” for latin 
america, the first decade of the new 
reports
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century was a period of economic 
gain.  strong exports led to a virtuous 
cycle of overall economic growth in 
many countries, in turn attracting 
more investment.  in this context, 
it was not surprising to see south 
Korea become the first asian country 
to sign a free trade area (fta) with 
a south american country, chile, in 
february 2003.  an fta with peru 
followed in march 2011, and another 
is being negotiated with colombia.  
conversations for an fta with 
mexico have been dragging for a 
number of years due to the resistance 
of the mexican private sector, and 
conversations with mercosur have yet 
to show clear progress, but bilateral 
relations with Brazil are thriving.  
south Korea also wants to sign an 
fta with the central american 
states, although the existing united 
states fta with the region could 
pose an obstacle to these intentions.
south Korean authorities are eager 
to promote private engagement in 
the region as part of the country’s 
general “global Korea” strategy.  
investment is on the rise, particularly 
in Brazil, mexico and peru.  hyundai 
will start producing cars in late 
2012 in Brazil, where electronics 
giant lg already has three factories.  
samsung runs a number of factories 
and facilities in mexico (in tijuana, 
Veracruz, guadalajara, mexico 
city and Querétaro).  The region 
is also in the sights of president lee 
myung Bak’s “resource diplomacy,” 
aimed at securing sources of raw 
material around the globe.  of 
particular interest to the country’s 
industry is lithium, some of the 
most important deposits of which 
are located in Bolivia, argentina 
and chile.  lithium is a strategic 
resource for manufacturing batteries 
for everything from smartphones and 
tablets to electric cars.  The south 
Korean steel giant posco has plans 
to build lithium-ion batteries with 
Bolivia’s comibol and is working 
with li3energy to exploit chile’s 
maricunga fields.  other economic 
areas with potential for growth are 
financial cooperation and tourism. 
south Korea’s political relations 
with latin america have historically 
been positive.  The region was a 
crucial battlefield in the two Koreas’ 
struggle for diplomatic recognition 
after the peninsula was divided in 
1948, a struggle that ended in 1991 
when both south and north Korea 
joined the united nations.  un 
general secretary Ban Ki-moon 
is an old friend of the region, and 
south Korea enjoys diplomatic 
relations with most countries in latin 
america, with the notable exception 
of cuba.  several latin american 
presidents have visited seoul and 
the region frequently receives visits 
from south Korean leaders.  current 
president lee myung-Bak visited 
peru and Brazil in 2008, and panama 
and mexico in 2010.  in november 
of that year, south Korea became 
the first non-g-8 country to host 
a g-20 summit, and it will hold 
the second nuclear summit in 
march 2012.  leaders of several 
latin american countries were 
scheduled to attend both events.  
each year, south Korean authorities 
meet with their mexican, chilean 
and peruvian counterparts at asian 
pacific economic cooperation 
(apec) meetings.
south Korea is also well 
represented in regional forums. it 
has been a permanent observer at the 
organization of american states since 
1981, and between 1999 and 2010 it 
contributed around $120,000 to the 
organization (just slightly less than 
china, which contributed roughly 
$130,000 in 2005-2010).  it is also a 
member of both the inter-american 
development Bank and the economic 
commission for latin america and 
the caribbean (eclac). 
The Korean presence in latin 
america is not new.  Korean 
immigrants make up one of the 
largest asian communities in 
the region.  Thriving Korean 
populations in Brazil (50,000), 
argentina (20,000-25,000), mexico 
(8,000-12,000), paraguay (5,000-
6000) and chile (2,000) help put 
a face to bilateral relations.  many 
Koreans living in latin america 
have re-migrated, engaging in 
samgak imin (triangular migration) 
from south and north Korea to 
paraguay, argentina and Brazil; from 
argentina to mexico and the united 
states; and back again to argentina.  
While most south Koreans are still 
deeply confucian, many decades of 
christianity and modernization have 
created a compatible framework for 
understanding with latin america. 
south Korea has cultivated public 
diplomacy for many years, first 
because of the legacy of Japanese 
colonialism and the struggle against 
north Korea and, more recently, in 
pursuit of soft power.  The Korea 
foundation has mobilized people-
to-people exchanges, academic 
cooperation and language courses.  in 
addition to Korean food, especially 
kimchi, the cultural exports with the 
strongest impact in latin america are 
taekwondo, an olympic sport, and 
Korean cinema.  Hallyu, the Korean 
pop culture (K-pop) movement 
spreading in asia, has also found a 
market in the region. 
south Korea and latin america 
have enjoyed a decade or more 
of increasing trade, cooperation, 
political understanding and cultural 
exchange. The stage is set for further 
expansion.  china may dominate 
asian-latin american relations, and 
Japan may try a comeback, but some 
fine niches and opportunities remain 
up for grabs for Korea. ■
Gonzalo Paz is a lecturer in the 
School of International Affairs at 
George Washington University.
reports
suGGested further readInG
armony, ariel c., and Julia c. strauss, 
eds.  From the Great Wall to the New 
World: China and Latin America 
in the 21st Century.  cambridge, 
england: cambridge university press, 
forthcoming.
Becard, danielly silva ramos.  o Brasil 
e a República Popular da China: política 
externa comparada e relações bilaterais 
(1974-2004).  porto alegre, Brazil: 
fundação alexandre de gusmão, 2008.
Bell, daniel.  China’s New Confucianism: 
Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing 
Society. princeton, n.J.: princeton 
university press, 2008.
cheng, Yinghong.  “fidel castro and 
china’s lesson for cuba.  a chinese 
perspective.”  The China Quarterly 189 
(2007): 24-42.
devlin, robert, antoni estevadeordal, 
and andrés rodríguez-clare.  The 
Emergence of China: opportunities and 
Challenges for Latin America and the 
Caribbean.  Washington, d.c.: iadB, 
2006.
domínguez, Jorge i., and Kim Byung 
Kook.  Between Compliance and 
Conflict: East Asia, Latin America, and 
the “New” Pax Americana.  new York: 
routledge, 2005.
dussel peters, enrique, and Yolanda 
trápaga delfín.  China y México: 
implicaciones de una nueva relación.  
mexico city: friedrich-ebert-stiftung/     
china institutes of contemporary 
international relations / senado de la 
república, 2010.
economic commission for latin 
america and the caribbean (eclac).  
“economic cooperation and ties 
between Japan and latin america and 
the caribbean.”  chapter V in Latin 
America and the Caribbean in the World 
Economy, 2009-2010.  santiago, chile: 
united nations-eclac, 2011.
-----India and Latin America and the 
Caribbean: opportunities and Challenges 
in Trade and Investment Relations.  
santiago, chile: united nations-
eclac, 2011. 
ellis, r. evan.  China in Latin America: 
The Whats and Wherefores.  Boulder, 
colo.: lynne rienner publishers, 2009.
erikson, daniel p., and Janice chen.  
“china, taiwan, and the Battle for 
latin america.”  The Fletcher Forum 
of World Affairs 31, no. 2 (summer 
2007): 69-89. 
faust, Jörg, manfred mols, and Won-
ho Kim.  Latin America and East Asia: 
Attempts at Diversification.  seoul, south 
Korea and münster, germany: Kiep 
and lit, 2005.
fernández, alex, and Barbara 
hogenboom, eds.  Latin America Facing 
China: South-South Relations beyond 
the Washington Consensus.  new York: 
Berghahn Books, 2010
gallagher, Kevin, and roberto 
porzecanski.  The Dragon in the Room: 
China and the Future of Latin American 
Industrialization.  palo alto, calif.: 
stanford university press, 2010. 
hearn, adrian h., and José luis león-
manríquez, eds. China Engages Latin 
America: Tracing the Trajectory.  Boulder, 
colo.: lynne rienner, 2011.
inter-american development Bank 
(iadB).  Korea: Breaking the Mold of 
the Asia-Latin America Relationship.  
Washington, d.c.: iadB, october 
2011. 
Jenkins, rhys.  “china’s global 
expansion and latin america.”  Journal 
of Latin American Studies 42, no. 2 
(2011): 809-837.
Johnston, alastair iain, and daniela 
stockman.  “chinese attitudes towards 
the united states and americans.”  in 
Anti-Americanisms in World Politics, 
edited by peter J. Katzenstein and 
robert o. Keohane, 157-195.  ithaca, 
nY: cornell university press, 2007.
lausent-herrera, isabelle.  “The 
chinatown in peru and the changing 
peruvian chinese community(ies).”  
Journal of Chinese overseas 7, no. 1 
(2011): 69-113.
look lai, Walton, and chee Beng tan.  
The Chinese in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. leiden, netherlands: Brill, 
2010.
mendelson, Johanna, and susana 
moreira.  “taiwan-china Balancing act 
in latin america.” in Chinese Soft Power 
and Its Implications for the United States: 
Competition and Cooperation in the 
Developing World, by carola mcgiffert.  
Washington, d.c.: center for strategic 
and international studies, 2009.
mesquita, mauricio.  India: Latin 
America’s Next Big Thing?  Washington, 
d.c: iadB, 2010.
paulino, luís antonio, and marcos 
cordeiro pires.  Nós e a China: o 
impacto da presença chinesa no Brasil e 
na América do Sul.  são paulo: lcte 
editora, 2009.
roett, riordan, and guadalupe 
paz, eds.  China’s Expansion into the 
Western Hemisphere: Implications 
for Latin America and the United 
States.  Washington, d.c.: Brookings 
institution, 2008.
sistema económico latinoamericano 
y del caribe (sela).  India’s Economy 
and Relations with Latin America and the 
Caribbean: Current Status and Prospects.  
caracas: sela, 2009. 
stallings, Barbara, and Kotaro 
horisaka.  “Japan and latin america: 
new patterns in the 1990s.”  in Latin 
America in a New World, edited by 
abraham f. lowenthal and gregory f. 
treverton, 126-149.  Boulder, colo.: 
Westview press, 1994. 
Hemisphere Volume 21 36
Who?
The Miami Consortium for Latin American and Caribbean Studies is a dynamic partnership 
between the Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC) at Florida International University (FIU) 
and the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) at the University of Miami (UM). Designated 
as a U.S. Department of Education National Resource Center on Latin America, the Miami 
Consortium for Latin American and Caribbean Studies is recognized as one of the nation’s top 
institutions for the study of Latin America and the Caribbean.  
Where?
From its incomparable location in Miami, the Miami Consortium for Latin American and Caribbean 
Studies creates unique and innovative opportunities for South Florida’s leading universities and 
the communities they serve.   
WhAt?
Built on more than 25 years of UM and FIU faculty, student and community collaboration, the 
Miami Consortium for Latin American and Caribbean Studies reaffirms South Florida as THE hub 
for political, commercial, cultural, and scholarly exchange between the U.S. and its neighbors 
to the South, and strategically positions Miami at the center of a broader global dialogue that 
connects the rest of the world to Latin America and the Caribbean.  
hoW?
The Miami Consortium for Latin American and Caribbean Studies spearheads cutting-edge 
research, expands and strengthens international linkages throughout the hemisphere, supports 
cultural and academic exchange, promotes outreach, training, and networking for a broad 
community of scholars, K-12 educators, journalists, governmental officials, and the business 
sector, and develops and implements projects designed to strengthen societies and improve 
the lives of people throughout the hemisphere.
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Winner of two Skytrax World Airline Awards categories in 2011: 
South America’s Best Airline and Excellence in Service in South America
Skytrax World Airline Awards is considered the most relevant benchmarking 
tool to precisely evaluate satisfaction levels of air passengers all over the world.
The winners are determined by an annual survey of more than 18 million people in 
over 100 countries that reveals passenger experience at airports and aboard aircraft.
Visit tamairlines.com and passiontoflyandserve.com
Call 1 888 2FLY TAM (235-9826) or consult a travel agent.
We’ve been honored by Skytrax
as South America’s best airline.
But for us the real honor is serving you.
